This week we’ll continue to discuss the possibility of Miracles:

We’re using the “Handbook of Apologetics” by Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli to go over the arguments for the existence of God.  Today, we will be covering the above question in relation to God.  Dr. Kreeft teaches logic in two major universities, so his arguments tend to be clear, concise and very helpful.


Arguments for the Possibility of Miracles

This section addresses only the possibility of miracles, to open the way to the historical investigation of their actuality. There are two arguments for the possibility of miracles: one from the side of God, the miracle-worker, or the cause, and the other from the side of the world, or the effect. We must show that both are open, not closed, to miracles.

First, there is no defense against miracles in God’s nature, no assurance that God would not work a miracle. For if there is a God, he is omnipotent (cf. chap. 4), and thus able to work miracles. Whether he would freely choose to do so or not is not a matter we can know a priori, for it would depend on his free choice. An omnipotent God could not be compelled to work or not work a miracle. So there is no obstacle to miracles in God. If there is a God, miracles are possible.

Second, there is no obstacle to or defense against miracles on the part of the world of nature. If God created it in the first place, that is, if nature is open to the possibilities of existing or not existing, then it is open to the possibilities of containing miracles or not containing them. In other words, if God can bang out the Big Bang of creation, he can certainly add some smaller bangs of miracles. If the author can create the play, he can change it too. And if the play is dependent on God, its author, for its very existence, then it is also dependent on him for whatever else he may want to do in it.

Kreeft, P., & Tacelli, R. K. (1994). Handbook of Christian apologetics: hundreds of answers to crucial questions (pp. 110–111). Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

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